Vicarious Liability of Roman Catholic Church for abuse
28th April 2010 by: Caroline Essex
The recent Court of Appeal judgement on the vicarious liability of employers for the actions of employees (i.e. the extent to which employers can be held accountable for the actions of their employees) in Maga v Trustees of the Birmingham Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church [2010] EWCA Civ 256 was handed down on 16 March 2010.
The Court of Appeal has held that an archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church was vicariously liable for the abuse of a non-Catholic boy by a priest, although the boy in question had no connection with the priest’s church.
The reason given in Maga for this decision was because the priest had special responsibilities for youth work and because the progressive stages of intimacy between the priest and the victim were only possible because the priest had the priestly status and authority that meant that no one would ever question his being alone with the victim.
Prior to the decision in Maga the test for whether an employer could be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees was whether the actions of the employee in question were sufficiently closely connected to his employment that it would be fair and just to hold his employer liable.
While the church in Maga had no legal obligation towards the victim, it was held that the special concern for the vulnerable and oppressed that is shown by the church is analogous to such a legal obligation. This special concern shown by the church, combined with the priest’s status and authority was enough to establish that there was a sufficient connection between what the priest was employed to do and the abuse perpetrated to hold the church vicariously liable for the actions of the priest.
Maga appears to extend the test previously set out to establish vicarious liability. However, this decision is yet to be tested. Would a court faced with a less upsetting set of facts be as willing to stretch the boundaries of the legal test in this way? It remains to be seen what impact the decision in Maga will have on the vicarious liability of employers moving forwards.
The Court of Appeal has held that an archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church was vicariously liable for the abuse of a non-Catholic boy by a priest, although the boy in question had no connection with the priest’s church.
The reason given in Maga for this decision was because the priest had special responsibilities for youth work and because the progressive stages of intimacy between the priest and the victim were only possible because the priest had the priestly status and authority that meant that no one would ever question his being alone with the victim.
Prior to the decision in Maga the test for whether an employer could be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees was whether the actions of the employee in question were sufficiently closely connected to his employment that it would be fair and just to hold his employer liable.
While the church in Maga had no legal obligation towards the victim, it was held that the special concern for the vulnerable and oppressed that is shown by the church is analogous to such a legal obligation. This special concern shown by the church, combined with the priest’s status and authority was enough to establish that there was a sufficient connection between what the priest was employed to do and the abuse perpetrated to hold the church vicariously liable for the actions of the priest.
Maga appears to extend the test previously set out to establish vicarious liability. However, this decision is yet to be tested. Would a court faced with a less upsetting set of facts be as willing to stretch the boundaries of the legal test in this way? It remains to be seen what impact the decision in Maga will have on the vicarious liability of employers moving forwards.
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